"The mystery of power lies not in why it appears, but in how it conceals itself; not in how it oppresses, but in how it produces; not in how it says 'no,' but in how it makes us willingly say 'yes.'"
Rethinking Power: From Coercive Force to the Capacity to Define Reality
The word "power" has always occupied a central yet contentious position in the history of human political and social thought. When we speak of power, what comes to mind are often vivid, dramatically charged scenes: a monarch issuing decrees, a general commanding armies, a judge bringing down the gavel, a capitalist shutting down a factory. In these classic imaginings, power appears as a clearly discernible, top-down force defined by coercion and domination. This intuitive understanding of power is deeply etched into our everyday language and political common sense, its theoretical origins traceable to Hobbes's Leviathan -- an absolute sovereign who monopolizes ultimate violence in order to end the "war of all against all."
In this classic "coercive force model," the logic of power's operation can be succinctly captured by Robert Dahl's famous definition: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." This definition is clear, concise, and operationalizable, reducing power relations to an observable, causal interaction between subjects. The core of power lies in overcoming others' resistance and imposing one's own will. Whether it is Max Weber's emphasis in his definition of "domination" on "the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons," or the broader tradition of political realism, the essence of power is anchored in coercion, latent violence, and the confrontation of wills.
This model undoubtedly captures a crucial and indispensable dimension of power's operation. From the conquests of ancient empires to the enforcement of law in modern states, coercive force has always been the ultimate guarantee and "final argument" of power structures. Yet if we limit our perspective to this alone, those broader, subtler, and more fundamental domains of the power landscape will slip silently out of our analysis. A profound paradox lies here: the more stable a society, the more consolidated its power structure, the further naked coercive force recedes into the background. People obey traffic laws not because there is an armed police officer at every intersection; employees strive to meet their KPIs not merely out of fear of dismissal. In the vast majority of cases, power operates not as a fierce confrontation of wills, but as an almost spontaneous, unthinking compliance.
This is precisely what the power theories of the second half of the twentieth century -- particularly those of thinkers like Michel Foucault -- sought to reveal. Foucault urged us to "cut off the king's head," that is, to liberate the study of power from the centralized perspective of sovereignty, law, and the state. Power is not an entity possessed by the few that can be owned or transferred like an object; it is a diffuse, relational, productive network. It is not merely negative "prohibition" and "oppression," but affirmative "production" and "shaping." Power produces knowledge, produces discourse, produces truth, and above all, it produces "subjects." The brilliance of what Foucault described as "disciplinary power" lies precisely in its transcendence of corporal punishment and its turn toward the shaping of the soul. Through panoptic surveillance, normalizing judgment, and meticulous training, disciplinary power aims to produce "docile bodies," causing individuals to internalize the external gaze of discipline and achieve efficient self-management.
From "coercive force" to "productivity" -- this marks a profound paradigm shift in power theory. It compels us to ask: if the most effective form of power is not coercion, then what is the fundamental mechanism of its operation? If power can produce reality, how is this "production" achieved?
This book argues that to answer these questions, we must take our understanding of power one crucial step further, to a more ontological level. Whether coercive force or productivity, these are merely different representations of power's operation. In its most fundamental sense, power is the capacity to define and shape "reality" itself. And this capacity to define reality is concretely manifested as the ability to filter, guide, and solidify "possibilities."
Consider a simple scenario: when an urban planner draws a new city blueprint, where does his (or her) power lie? Not in the coercive force to mobilize bulldozers and cranes, but at an earlier stage: choosing and solidifying one possibility among countless possible road networks, functional zones, and architectural forms. Once the blueprint is finalized and implemented, it becomes a solid "material reality," profoundly shaping the commuting patterns, social interactions, class distribution, and even health conditions of millions of residents for decades or even centuries to come. Residents will live within the "space of possibility" set by the planner; their "free choices" (which road to take to work, where to shop) are in fact choices made within a pre-constructed framework. The planner's power lies precisely in this capacity to transform one "possibility" into an overwhelming "actuality," thereby converging the possibilities of others' future actions.
This example reveals a core secret of power: the most powerful form of power is not winning the game within existing rules, but making the rules of the game itself. This "meta-power" -- the power to define the framework of reality -- is precisely the core of what this book calls "evaluative power." By setting standards, establishing classifications, assigning value, and defining "normal" versus "abnormal," "success" versus "failure," "credible" versus "untrustworthy," it constructs a coordinate system of meaning and value that guides the actions of social members. Within this coordinate system, certain possibilities are highlighted, encouraged, and rewarded, while others are obscured, suppressed, and punished.
Thus, this book proposes a redefinition of power: power is the capacity to systematically converge the possibilities of others' actions while maintaining or expanding the possibilities of one's own actions. It is a structural force that shapes the "ground of possibility." The more powerful this force, the more concealed its operation, for it does not act directly upon people's behavior, but upon the very "horizon of possibility" within which behavior occurs. It makes the choices we make seem like the "only reasonable" or "natural" ones, while the possibilities that have been excluded are ones we cannot even begin to imagine.
From coercive force to the capacity to define reality -- this shift in perspective provides a crucial theoretical entry point for understanding the operation of power in the digital age. In the digital age, algorithms, platforms, and data constitute the most powerful "reality-defining engines" of our time. No longer requiring physical construction to solidify possibilities like the urban planner does, they can, through code and data, build a unique "space of possibility" for each user in real time, dynamically, and personally. Recommendation algorithms define the possibilities of what we see in the world (information, goods, friends); credit-scoring algorithms define the possibilities of our access to financial services and social resources; platform rules define the possibilities of workers earning income.
This new form of power has its coercive aspect masked by the appearance of "personalized recommendations" and "free choice," while its productive aspect is manifested in the continuous shaping of "datafied subjects." To reveal the secret of its operation, we must delve into its ontological core, first understanding what exactly this "ground of possibility" shaped by power is, and how social reality is constructed through interaction with this substrate.
The "Ground of Possibility" and the Construction of Social Reality
To systematically articulate the core thesis that "power is the capacity to converge possibilities," we must introduce a more fundamental ontological concept: the "ground of possibility." This concept is the cornerstone of the book's theoretical framework, offering a new perspective on the dynamic generation of social reality.
The "ground of possibility" can be conceived as a theoretical, infinite set that exists prior to any specific social structure or system of meaning, containing all potential social actions, social relations, interpretations of meaning, and organizational forms. It is not a physical entity but a conceptual "field" -- the "potentiality" itself of the social world. In this substrate, everything is possible: humans can organize into matrilineal clans or atomized nuclear families; they can use seashells as a medium of exchange or complex cryptocurrencies; they can believe in pantheism, monotheism, or atheism. Before these potential forms of existence are "actualized," they coexist in the ground of possibility as parallel, indeterminate states.
This concept draws on multiple intellectual resources. It has a structural resemblance to the "wave function" or "superposition of states" in quantum mechanics -- before being "observed," a particle can exist in multiple possible states simultaneously. It also echoes Gilles Deleuze's concept of the "virtual" -- the virtual is not unreal, but a real potential generative force underlying actual processes. And it resonates with classical Chinese philosophy, particularly "the Way" or "non-being" in the Daodejing: "All things under heaven are born of being; being is born of non-being." This "non-being" is not utter emptiness, but the primordial source that gestates all things, full of infinite possibility.
Yet the social world we experience is not a chaotic field of infinite possibility, but a highly structured "reality" full of certainty and regularity. Every day we wake up confident that the sun will rise, that currency can be used to purchase goods, that language can be used to communicate. How does this transition from "infinite possibility" to "finite actuality" occur?
This book argues that the construction of social reality is precisely a process of continuous "convergence" upon the "ground of possibility." "Convergence" here refers to a set of social mechanisms through which infinite potential possibilities are filtered, selected, and solidified, eventually coalescing into the relatively stable structures and patterns we call "reality." This process can be understood as a form of "social observation" in a broad sense.
Just as in quantum mechanics, the act of "observation" causes a superposed wave function to "collapse" into a definite state, so in the social realm, collective "observation" -- that is, collective attention, consensus, assessment, and practice -- causes fluid possibilities to "condense" into determinate social facts. These mechanisms of "social observation" include:
- Language and systems of classification: Language is the primary mechanism for converging possibilities. When we use the word "tree" to refer to a particular class of plants, we cut, demarcate, and solidify a conceptual category from the infinite continuous diversity of the plant world. This category converges our perception of this type of plant, making it a communicable, operable "object." All systems of classification -- from the legal distinction between "legal person" and "natural person," to psychiatry's definition of "normal" and "abnormal" -- are powerful convergence mechanisms. They draw boundaries on the ground of possibility, transforming chaotic continua into ordered, discrete units of reality.
- Norms and institutions: Social norms (such as customs and morality) and institutions (such as law and property rights) are even more powerful convergence mechanisms. They provide "scripts" and "rules" for social interaction, drastically converging the range of behavioral possibilities in specific situations. For example, the institution of marriage converges the infinite possibilities of human reproduction and intimacy into a few socially recognized, stable patterns with specific rights and obligations. The institution of property rights converges the infinite possibilities of possession, use, and transfer of objects into the core concept of "ownership," upon which the entire market economy is built.
- Technology and material arrangements: Technology and the material environment are also powerful forces that shape possibility. The construction of a highway greatly enhances the possibility of intercity travel, while potentially diminishing the possibility of villages along its route maintaining their traditional way of life. The invention of the internet opened up vast possibilities for global instant communication while also introducing the possibilities of information cocoons and cyber-balkanization. As the urban planning example shows, material infrastructure is "solidified" paths of possibility convergence, guiding our bodies and actions in a lasting and profound way.
- Values and systems of assessment: This is the most central and agentive of all convergence mechanisms. The core values held by a society, along with the systems of assessment built upon those values, directly determine which possibilities are considered "good" and "desirable," and are therefore preferentially selected and actualized. In a society that takes economic growth as its primary assessment metric, possibilities that promote GDP (such as industrial development and technological innovation) are strongly incentivized, while those that are difficult to quantify (such as environmental protection, community solidarity, and spiritual life) may be marginalized.
Through the coordinated action of these mechanisms, social reality is constructed layer by layer. It is not an "objective" entity external to us, waiting to be discovered, but a "snapshot" of converged possibilities, "locked in" through the collective actions and assessments of successive generations. This "snapshot," through long-term repeated practice and mutual confirmation, acquires a rock-solid illusion of "objectivity." As Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann incisively observed in The Social Construction of Reality, society is a dialectical unity of "objective fact" and "subjective fact." We create society, and in turn we are shaped by the society we have created. In the terms of this book: through collective assessment we converge the ground of possibility and create social reality; in turn, this solidified social reality becomes the pre-established framework of our action, constraining and guiding our future possibilities.
Once we understand this constructive process of social reality, we can look at "power" with fresh eyes. Power is no longer merely the act of competing for resources on a pre-constructed "stage of reality," but a more fundamental act of intervening in the very "process of reality construction" itself. Power is the capacity to dominate the process of converging possibilities. It is the ability to "actualize" the paths that align with one's own interests and will from the infinite potential of the ground of possibility, and to make them an "objective reality" that others must confront.
When we elevate power to this ontological level, a key question emerges: in any society, is this capacity to dominate the convergence of possibilities equally distributed? The answer is clearly no. This brings us to the analysis of the "power hierarchy."
The Formation of "Power Hierarchy": The Asymmetric Distribution of Evaluative Power
If social reality is the product of converged possibilities, then the core secret of social structure lies in the asymmetric distribution of this "power to converge." In any organized social group -- from the family to the state, from small factions to the global system -- members differ significantly in their capacity to define and shape collective reality. This book terms this difference the "power hierarchy."
The concept of "power hierarchy" is partly inspired by Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong's theory of the "differential mode of association." Fei observed that the network of interpersonal relations in traditional Chinese society does not follow the bounded, group-based "corporate mode" of Western societies, but rather resembles ripples spreading outward from a stone thrown into water -- centered on the self and extending outward in gradations of distance and intimacy. This book borrows the notion of "gradated order" to emphasize that power is not a binary state of "having or not having," but a continuous, hierarchical spectrum. Different social actors, depending on the degree of their "capacity to converge possibilities," are positioned at different points along this spectrum.
The concrete manifestation of this capacity to converge possibilities is what we have repeatedly called "evaluative power." The "evaluation power" -- the power to establish standards, execute judgment, and imbue that judgment with social consequences -- is the core mechanism through which the structure of the power hierarchy is formed and reproduced. An actor's position in the power hierarchy directly depends on the level and breadth of the evaluative power they possess.
Based on this, we can broadly divide social actors into two ideal types:
Dominant Subjects
Dominant subjects are those who occupy the apex of the power hierarchy. Their defining characteristic is their possession of "first-order evaluative power" -- the power to define the rules of the game. They are not merely players in the game, but its designers. Specifically, they possess one or more of the following capacities:
Standard-setting power: The ability to create, define, and impose standards for measuring value. For example, the state makes laws, thereby defining "legal" and "illegal"; academic authorities define the criteria for evaluating research output; technology giants, through their platform algorithms, define what constitutes "quality content" or "relevant information."
Mechanism-design power: The ability to design and implement the specific mechanisms and processes of assessment. For instance, corporations design their internal performance evaluation systems; financial institutions design credit-scoring models; education departments design the college entrance examination system.
Power to interpret and enforce results: The ability not only to produce assessment results, but to authoritatively interpret their meaning and link them to systems of reward and punishment, thereby generating real material and social consequences. A "poor" performance evaluation can lead to demotion or dismissal; a "low" credit score can result in a loan denial.
By monopolizing first-order evaluative power, dominant subjects succeed in transforming their own value preferences, interests, and logic of governance into seemingly objective, neutral, and universal "social reality." The assessment systems they construct become the "infrastructure" that other social members must navigate, profoundly shaping the living space and action strategies of subordinated subjects.
Subordinated Subjects
Subordinated subjects are those positioned in the lower and middle tiers of the power hierarchy. Their defining characteristic is that their scope of action is largely confined to the level of "second-order assessment." Second-order assessment refers to the strategic selection and adaptation within the assessment framework pre-established by dominant subjects. They are recipients of the rules of the game, not their makers.
Passive reception of assessment: Their behavior, abilities, and even personal traits are continuously scrutinized and judged by external assessment systems.
Optimization within the framework: Their agency is primarily expressed in how better to "conform to" assessment standards in order to achieve better outcomes within the established game. For example, students engage in exam-oriented training to score high on the college entrance examination; delivery riders wait "five more minutes" to earn platform praise; content creators use clickbait titles to appeal to algorithmic recommendations.
Limited space for maneuvering: Subordinated subjects are not entirely passive puppets; they develop various "strategies of resistance" -- such as review manipulation, coasting, exploiting rule loopholes, and the like. Yet these acts of gaming are mostly confined to the cracks of the rules and rarely challenge the assessment framework itself in any fundamental way.
The formation of the power hierarchy is a historical, dynamic process. It often originates from certain groups gaining an initial advantage under specific historical conditions (such as military conquest, technological innovation, or capital accumulation), and then consolidating this provisional advantage into a lasting structure by establishing an assessment system favorable to themselves. For example, early capitalists, through their ownership of the means of production, gained the power to assess "labor value," and on this basis established the entire capitalist system of production relations and distribution. In the digital age, technology companies that first seized the "means of assessment" -- data, algorithms, and platforms -- have become the new dominant subjects, building a new power hierarchy.
Once this power hierarchy is formed, it possesses a powerful capacity for self-reproduction. The assessment standards set by dominant subjects are widely disseminated through channels such as education, media, and markets, gradually becoming internalized as the "common sense" or "second nature" of social members. People begin to evaluate themselves and others using these standards, unconsciously reproducing the power structure in their daily lives. A user seeking more "likes" on social media is, in effect, measuring their own social value using the platform's evaluative logic, thereby actively integrating themselves into the power hierarchy set by the platform.
Hence, the "power hierarchy" is not merely a macro-structure of unequal resource distribution, but also a micro-network of power concerning cognition, values, and subjectivity. It reveals that assessment is not a neutral technical activity, but a political struggle without gunpowder smoke. The core of this struggle lies in the contest for "first-order evaluative power" -- the power to define reality. Understanding this is the key to grasping the new forms of power struggle in the digital age, and it paves the way for the in-depth analysis of "the evaluation alienation" in subsequent chapters.
A Dialogue with Classical Theories of Power: Marx, Weber, and Foucault
No new theoretical construction can take place in a vacuum. It must establish its own coordinates and value through dialogue, debate, and integration with existing intellectual traditions. This section attempts to place our proposed theoretical framework of "evaluative power" in dialogue with three giants of modern thought on power -- Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Michel Foucault. The purpose of this dialogue is not simply to negate what came before, but to acknowledge their profound insights while demonstrating how our theoretical framework complements, extends, and in some respects transcends their ideas, thereby providing more fitting analytical tools for understanding the phenomena of power in our own age, particularly in the digital era.
Dialogue with Marx: From "Means of Production" to "Means of Assessment"
Marx's revolutionary contribution to the analysis of power lies in his relocating power from the superstructure of politics and law to the solid ground of the economic base. In Marx's view, the most fundamental power relation in capitalist society originates in the private ownership of the means of production. The bourgeoisie is able to dominate the proletariat not because of any natural superiority or greater violence, but because it monopolizes the material conditions -- land, factories, machinery -- necessary for workers to labor and sustain their existence.
This power based on the ownership of the means of production is, at its core, a profound form of "evaluative power." As the owner of the means of production, the capitalist naturally possesses the power to assess "labor" -- the central human activity. He determines:
The assessment of labor access: who may enter the factory to work.
The assessment of the labor process: at what speed and in what manner the worker should labor (Taylorism being the ultimate expression of this process assessment).
The assessment of labor output: what value the worker's product has, and how much of it should be paid back as wages (the core of surplus value theory).
From this perspective, Marx's theory of power aligns closely with our framework. The power of the capitalist is a quintessential "first-order evaluative power," while the worker's situation is to engage in "second-order assessment" within this assessment framework -- choosing to accept exploitation or facing unemployment. The "alienation" Marx described also has a deep kinship with the "evaluation alienation" we will elaborate in the next chapter.
However, our theoretical framework attempts to extend Marx in two respects:
First, universalizing the basis of power. Marx traced the root of power primarily to the ownership of the means of production within the economic sphere. Our theory of "evaluative power" holds that the means of production are merely one specific historical form of "means of assessment" in the era of industrial capitalism. In different social formations, "means of assessment" can take different forms. In pre-modern societies, they might be the religious knowledge that interprets divine will or the ritual-legal system that maintains kinship ties. In the knowledge economy era, they might be patents and academic credentials. In our digital age, the most important "means of assessment" increasingly manifest as data, algorithms, and platforms. The core power of tech giants like Google, Meta, and Amazon derives not from the ownership of physical factories, but from the monopolization of global data flows, the design power over algorithms that shape user behavior, and the platform status serving as the infrastructure of the digital economy. They have seized the "means of assessment" of the new era, becoming the core power subjects of digital capitalism. This shift allows us to use a more universal framework to analyze power structures across different historical stages.
Second, emphasizing the cultural and cognitive dimensions of power. Although Marx also discussed the reactive role of the superstructure through the theory of "ideology," the center of gravity of his theory always remained in the economic base. Our framework, from the outset, places the cognitive and value dimensions of power at its core. Evaluative power is not merely a form of economic domination, but also a "cognitive monopoly" and a "power to define values." By shaping our "common sense," it makes us accept a certain value ordering as "natural." For example, platform capitalism not only economically exploits delivery riders, but also culturally equates "service" with "subservience," and through rating mechanisms, turns consumers into "little sovereigns" holding micro-evaluative power over workers. This shaping of the subject's cognition and values is the deep foundation upon which evaluative power operates stably, no less important than the dimension of economic domination.
Dialogue with Weber: From "Legitimacy of Domination" to "Ontology of Assessment"
If Marx revealed the economic roots of power, Max Weber focused on power's political and social forms, particularly the question of its "legitimacy." Weber's classic contribution was his distinction between mere power and legitimate domination. A stable power structure cannot rely solely on violence; it must also elicit, to some degree, the dominated subjects' belief in its rightfulness. Weber accordingly distinguished three ideal types of legitimacy: traditional (based on custom and tradition), charismatic (based on the leader's extraordinary personal magnetism), and legal-rational (based on impersonal law and rules).
Weber's theory -- especially his analysis of "legal-rational domination" -- offers profound insights for our understanding of modern evaluative power. The core of legal-rational domination is bureaucracy, and bureaucracy is essentially a vast, rationalized machine of assessment. Through clear hierarchies, specialized knowledge, codified rules, and impersonal procedures, it efficiently manages and adjudicates social affairs. In this sense, the ubiquitous assessment systems of modern society -- examinations, audits, certifications, qualification reviews -- can all be seen as products of the Weberian process of rationalization.
Our theory of "evaluative power" lies on the extended line of this grand historical process described by Weber. Algorithmic assessment in the digital age can be seen as the ultimate form of bureaucratic rationalization. It pushes "impersonality" to its extreme -- the assessing subject is no longer even human, but code; it internalizes "rules" within the logic of the algorithm, making it more efficient and also more opaque.
Yet our theoretical perspective also differs from Weber in its emphasis:
First, moving from the question of "legitimacy" to the question of "ontology." Weber's core question was: why is domination obeyed? He sought the answer in the subjective beliefs of social actors. Our core question, by contrast, is: how does power construct the "reality" within which we act? We are asking a more prior, ontological question. Before people can deliberate on whether an assessment system is "legitimate" (the question of legitimacy), that system has already, through its operation, shaped the very "facts" and "values" people use to make judgments. For example, before we discuss whether the college entrance examination is "fair" (the question of legitimacy), the assessment mechanism of the exam itself has already profoundly constructed our definitions of "talent," "knowledge," and "success" (the question of ontology). Our framework seeks to reveal that evaluative power, before obtaining its "legitimacy," has already laid the foundation for that legitimacy through its "ontological" function of constructing reality.
Second, revealing the power asymmetry behind "rationalization." When describing rationalization, Weber often adopted a "value-neutral" sociological objectivity, though he worried about the "iron cage" of the future. Our concept of "power hierarchy" aims to inject a more critical analysis of power into this seemingly neutral process of rationalization. We emphasize that no rationalized assessment system emerges from nowhere; it is always designed and implemented by "dominant subjects" within specific power relations. Behind the "rationality" of the algorithm lie the interests, biases, and worldview of its designers. Thus, what we see is not a universal, homogeneous iron cage of rationalization, but an assessment network rife with hierarchy and serving specific power interests. For some, this network is a ladder of ascent; for others, it may be nothing less than a fetter.
Dialogue with Foucault: From "Discipline/Biopower" to "Evaluative Power"
Foucault is undoubtedly the most direct and important intellectual precursor of this book. As stated at the opening of this chapter, it is on Foucault's shoulders that we are able to discern the new forms of power in the digital age. Foucault's analysis of power -- particularly his revelation of the knowledge/power relationship and his incisive examination of disciplinary techniques (such as the examination and inspection) -- has already touched the core of "evaluative power." The "normalizing judgment" in Foucault's work is a paradigmatic evaluative activity, which classifies, rewards, punishes, and corrects individuals by comparing them to a "norm."
Our theory of "evaluative power" can, to a large extent, be seen as a systematic, theoretical attempt to extend Foucault's thought into the context of the digital age. We seek to string together Foucault's scattered insights into various micro-techniques of power like scattered pearls into a single, more comprehensive theoretical framework.
Our dialogue with Foucault is primarily one of "inheritance and development":
First, giving the diffuse power a central mechanism. Foucault emphasized the diffuseness and network-like nature of power, opposing the search for a single center of power. This immensely broadened our perspective. Yet at times it also makes his analysis appear too dispersed, making it difficult to form a unified analytical focus. Our theory of "evaluative power," while acknowledging the diffuseness of power, seeks to point out that in contemporary society (especially digital society), this diffuse operation of power is increasingly organized and carried out around one core mechanism: "assessment." Assessment has become the "lingua franca" connecting different power techniques (from self-management to algorithmic governance). This provides us with a more focused analytical entry point for capturing and dissecting the operation of contemporary power.
Second, systematizing the asymmetry of power's operation. Although Foucault also attended to inequalities in power relations, he was more inclined to describe how power flows through and operates on everyone. Our concept of "power hierarchy" seeks to explain this inequality more explicitly and structurally. By distinguishing between "first-order evaluative power" and "second-order assessment," we can more clearly identify who are the makers of rules and who are the bearers of rules, thereby connecting Foucault's micro-analysis of power with broader macro-structural issues of social inequality (such as class and platform monopoly). This allows our framework to engage more productively with the Marxist tradition of political economy critique.
Finally, updating the historical form of power technology. Foucault's analysis was primarily based on archives from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The ideal model of the disciplinary power he described was the "panopticon." We argue that the technology of power in the digital age has undergone a profound transformation. Its ideal model is no longer the physical prison, but the fluid, omnipresent "algorithmic panopticon." It no longer merely pursues "normalization," but "optimization"; it is no longer satisfied with retrospective correction, but is devoted to prospective prediction and intervention. The subsequent chapters of this book -- analyzing algorithmic credit, platform labor, and social media -- are precisely intended to concretely depict "evaluative power" as the latest historical form of this Foucauldian power.
In summary, through dialogue with Marx, Weber, and Foucault, we are able to more clearly define the uniqueness and contribution of the theory of "evaluative power." It absorbs Marx's insight into the relationship between the economic base and power, extending it from "means of production" to the more universal "means of assessment"; it inherits Weber's analysis of rationalization and legitimacy, infusing it with a critical perspective on the asymmetry of power; it stands on Foucault's shoulders, finding a contemporary core mechanism for the diffuse network of power and updating the historical form of its technology.
Thus, we have laid the first cornerstone of our theoretical edifice. We have rethought the essence of power, defining it as the capacity to converge possibilities; we have constructed the ontology of the "ground of possibility" and elaborated how social reality is constructed through assessment; we have proposed the core concept of the "power hierarchy," revealing the unequal distribution of evaluative power. Finally, through dialogue with classical theories, we have clarified our own theoretical position.
Yet one key question remains to be answered: when the activity of assessment operates within this structure of power hierarchy, what distortions does it itself undergo? What far-reaching harm does it inflict upon our society, our cognition, and our very subjectivity as human beings? This is the central theme to be explored in the next chapter: "The Evaluation Alienation."